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7 do not possess the collateral
property. Rather, the trustee retains
possessory rights. Boodrow, there-
fore, did not truly retain possession
of his car after discharge.
Judge Shadur also disagreed with
the majority's reasoning that the
court was still able to grant relief to
Capital if it agreed with Capital's
interpretation of § 521(2). The
majority had reasoned that relief
could take the form of remanding
back to the bankruptcy court with an
order to compel Boodrow to comply
with the statute, which the majority
explained was Capital's real purpose
in filing its motion to lift the stay.
The dissent reasoned that Capital had
not filed a motion to dismiss or
compel Boodrow to comply with §
521(2). Capital's motion to lift the
stay was an end total in itself. The
only reason that Capital filed a
motion to lift the automatic stay was
to pursue further remedies under state
law. The dissent suggested that the
majority had read additional requests
for relief into Capital's motion to
create a live controversy. Since
Capital had only requested relief in
the form of lifting the stay, the
majority was essentially rewriting
Capital's motion. Therefore, when
the bankruptcy court discharged
Boodrow, no additional controversy
remained regarding Capital's motion
to lift the stay.
The dissent further dismissed
Capital's claim that the case should
be heard as an exception to the
mootness doctrine because the issue
was "capable of repetition, yet
evading review." The exception
allows certain special issues into
review even if they are moot. The
dissent explained that the exception
to the mootness doctrine was only
applicable in special circumstances:
both where the case ended too soon
so that the issue was never fully
litigated prior to becoming moot, and
where one could reasonably expect
that the injured party would probably
face the same issue again in future
proceedings. The dissent found that
such an exception did not apply
because prior judicial deliberations in
other jurisdictions showed that the
courts had fully litigated the validity
of reinstatement under § 521(2). The
dissent contended that the court
lacked jurisdiction to hear the merits
of Capital's motion to lift the
automatic stay when it became moot.
In addressing the merits of
interpreting § 521(2), the dissent
contended that Congress had listed
all of a debtor's options in § 521(2).
That section only provides three
options: surrender, redemption, or
reaffirmation. Accordingly, the
phrase, "if applicable," does not give
the debtor a fourth option to keep the
collateral and continue payments.
Furthermore, the dissent pointed out
that the 45-day time limit specified in
§ 521(2) means that a debtor cannot
continue payments for months or
years under reinstatement and remain
consistent with such a time limit. The
dissent also stated that, because
reinstatement options are not
mentioned in any other provision of
the Code, the provisions of § 521(2)
must be exclusive. The dissent also
noted that debtors would obviously
opt for reinstatement over any other
option under § 521(2) because a
debtor would not have to pay the full
balance of his loan in one lump sum
payment or negotiate with his
creditors in a reaffirmation agreement
where he would have substantially
inferior bargaining power. Though
reinstatement is desirable to debtors,
if Congress did not intend for the
debtor to have a reinstatement option,
the court may not devise a new
alternative for the debtor.
Purchaser of Ship Allowed to Recover for
Damage to Ship's Equipment
By Zachary Raimi
In Saratoga Fishing Co. v. J.M.
Martinac & Co., 117 S. Ct. 1783
(1997), on remand sub nom.
Saratoga Fishing Co. v. Marco
Seattle Inc., 122 F.3d 1250 (1997),
the United States Supreme Court
reversed the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit by
holding that a plaintiff in admiralty
may recover for physical damage that
a defective portion of a ship caused
to equipment that the original owner
added to the ship before the plaintiff
purchased the vessel. The Court
found that Plaintiff could recover
under admiralty tort rules because the
added equipment was not part of the
"product itself' -- the ship -- but
rather was "other property" distinct
from the ship.
Defective Hydraulic System Caused
Fishing Vessel to Sink
In the early 1970s, J.M. Martinac
& Company ("Martinac") manufac-
tured a ship, a component of which
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was a hydraulic system that Marco
Seattle Inc. ("Marco") had built.
After Joseph Madruga ("Madruga")
purchased the ship, he added
equipment to the vessel, including a
skiff and a seine net, in order to use
the ship for tuna fishing. Then, in
1974, Madruga resold the ship to
Petitioner Saratoga Fishing Company
("Saratoga'). In January of 1986, a
fire erupted in the boat's engine room,
and the vessel flooded and sank.
As a result, Saratoga brought a
tort suit in admiralty against Respon-
dents Martinac and Marco. The
district court found that the defec-
tively designed hydraulic system
caused the ship to sink. Accordingly,
the court awarded Saratoga damages
for the loss of the equipment that
Madruga had installed (minus a
portion of the claimed damages
because Saratoga was partially at
fault). Both sides appealed to the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
which reversed the lower court's
ruling.
Ninth Circuit Reversed Based on
East River Doctrine
The Ninth Circuit first noted that
the "East River doctrine" controls in
admiralty tort law when a defective
product causes physical damage. In
East River S.S. Corp. v.
Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U.S.
858 (1986), the Supreme Court held
that tort plaintiffs in admiralty cases
"cannot recover for the physical
damage the defective product causes
to the 'property itself,' but the
plaintiff can recover for physical
damage the product causes to 'other
property."' In coming to this conclu-
sion, the East River Court reasoned
that the loss of the "property itself'
constituted an economic loss for
which tort law generally denies
recovery. The Court explained that
physical damage to a product and the
loss of its value was similar to the
loss of a product's value that did not
function properly from the moment it
was purchased. In these cases, the
Court noted that contract and
warranty law govern based on the
bargain struck between the parties.
The Ninth Circuit interpreted East
River to determine whether the
equipment Madruga added to the ship
was part of the "product itself," not
"other property." The appellate court
found that the "product itself" was
the ship that Plaintiff had purchased,
including the added equipment,
because it was the product that
Plaintiff could have, theoretically,
bargained with the seller to put under
warranty when he purchased the
vessel. Therefore, the appellate court
reasoned under the East River
doctrine, Plaintiff could not recover
tort damages for an injury to the
equipment on the ship. Saratoga
appealed and the Supreme Court
granted certiorari to clarify the proper
application ofEast River.
Supreme Court Determined That
Saratoga Could Recover for Added
Property
The Supreme Court rejected the
Ninth Circuit's interpretation of East
River and held that any additions to
property after its initial purchase
from the manufacturer or distributor
are not part of the "property itself'
but are "other property." Further,
plaintiffs may recover under tort law
for damages that defective products
cause to this "other property." The
Court, in an opinion written by
Justice Breyer, advanced several
reasons for this holding. First, the
Court declared that the Ninth
Circuit's decision would wrongfully
immunize product manufacturers
from tort liability "beyond that set by
any relevant tort precedent." The
Court explained that the Ninth
Circuit's decision undermined an
underlying policy of tort law --
encouraging the production of safer
items. If Saratoga were not allowed to
recover, the manufacturer would be
immune from liability merely because
of the fortuity that Saratoga pur-
chased the ship from a previous user
and was not the initial user. The
Court explained that this result
would not encourage manufacturers
to create safe products.
Further, the Court questioned the
Ninth Circuit's conclusion that a
reseller would give the subsequent
purchaser a warranty covering
property damage. It would be difficult
for a reseller to offer an adequate
warranty; after all, he would not have
been involved in the manufacturing of
the ship, and therefore, would be
unfamiliar with the risks of such a
warranty. Additionally, the Court
noted that Respondents did not
demonstrate that it was "ordinary
business practice" for users/resellers
to offer warranties to subsequent
buyers. Hence, even though the
subsequent buyer would lack a
warranty from the product's manufac-
turer or distributor, the Court
reasoned that it would be inappropri-
ate to expect the reseller to warrant a
product he was reselling for potential
damages.
The Court also dismissed Respon-
dents' two additional arguments.
First, Respondents had claimed that
the Court's holding would allow a
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user to recover damages for every
component part of the ship except the
defective one, in this case, the
hydraulic engine. The Court rejected
this argument because lower courts
have held that the vessel, not its
component parts, is the "product"
that has caused the damages when a
component part of the vessel mal-
functions and damages the entire
ship. Therefore, a ship owner cannot
recover in tort for the damage to
components of the ship but must look
to the manufacturer's warranties for
compensation.
Second, Respondents argued that
the Court's holding would unreason-
ably expand the manufacturer's or
distributor's tort liability. The Court
rejected this argument because many
other tort principles, such as proxi-
mate cause and foreseeability, already
limit tort liability, and because
potential liability would exist even if
the initial user had retained posses-
sion of the product.
Dissnet Defined "Product" as the
Object of the Purchaser's Bargain
According to Justice Scalia,
joined by Justice Thomas, the
Supreme Court should not have
granted this case certiorari. Justice
O'Connor, who separately dissented,
disagreed with Justices Scalia and
Thomas only on this point. Scalia
argued that the Court had no prece-
dent directly addressing the issue
before the Court and asserted that the
case should have been left to the
lower courts as the Supreme Court
has little experience in creating
common law principles.
Nonetheless, Scalia proceeded to
analyze the merits. First, the dissent
revealed facts that the majority
opinion did not explore. Specifically,
Madruga appeared to be in the
business of designing and assembling
tuna boats; in fact, the boat sold to
Saratoga was Madruga's third of
seven commissions. Moreover,
Madruga was heavily involved in the
original construction of the ship.
Hence, Scalia reasoned that
Martinac's original boat was a
component of the tuna fishing vessel
that Madruga intended to resell later
as a finished product. Therefore, the
additional equipment was another
component part of the "product" --
the tuna fishing vessel that Saratoga
purchased.
Scalia objected to the majority's
assertion that a product is "fixed" as
a product once it is sold to the initial
user, even if that user is in the
business of "modifying and reselling
that product." Scalia argued that the
case should not hinge on whether a
defective product caused damage to
added equipment before or after the
party who added equipment resells
the product. Scalia argued that if
Madruga was in the business of
buying and selling tuna fishing boats,
it should not matter if he briefly used
the boat prior to its sale. Plaintiff
should not be able to recover tort
damages that he could not recover if
he had purchased the ship directly
from the manufacturer with the added
equipment.
Scalia next argued that the Court
should have selected a different rule
to support its conclusion. For
example, the "seller rule" under the
Restatement (Second) of Torts §
402A (1964) was more appropriate.
Under this rule, a product would be
"fixed" when the last person in "the
chain of distribution" sells the boat.
This rule would be consistent with
the East River Court's concern that
tort protection should be used only
when a buyer cannot obtain a
warranty under a contract to pur-
chase.
Another rule the majority could
have selected was the "object-of-the-
bargain rule," which many state
courts have adopted. This rule
considers the product that a buyer
purchased or bargained for to decide
whether the added equipment is
"other property." Under this ap-
proach, the dissent implied that
Madruga's addition would not be
considered "other property" since
Saratoga purchased the vessel with
the equipment already in place. In
sum, Justices Scalia, Thomas and
O'Connor disagreed with the majority
and would have ruled differently in
this case.
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